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From Flood Flows to Flood Maps: The Understanding 
of Flood Probabilities in the United States 
Brian Rumsey ∗ 
Abstract: »Von Flutströmen zu Flutkarten: Das Verständnis von Flutwahr-
scheinlichkeiten in den Vereinigten Staaten«. In the twentieth century, proba-
bility became an important tool in the understanding of flood recurrences and 
magnitudes. This article focuses on the development of probabilistic flood un-
derstandings in the United States. Early efforts focused on projecting flood 
volumes, but maps of flood risk, brought about in large part by the National 
Flood Insurance Program, did much to cultivate this way of thinking in a broad 
audience. Engineers such as Weston Fuller and Allen Hazen, and geographer 
Gilbert White, play important roles in the trajectory developed in the article. 
The closely related ideas of the hundred-year flood and the hundred-year 
floodplain became standard terminology for communicating flood risk, but the 
knowledge behind them has been called into doubt by the realization of rapid, 
anthropogenic climate change.  
Keywords: Environmental history, National Flood Insurance Program, Weston 
Fuller, Allen Hazen, quantification methods, 100-year flood. 
 
During the building of the Melan Arch Bridge over the Kansas River in Topeka 
in 1897, the city engineer’s records, spanning 25 years, indicated a 15-foot 
range between the highest and lowest recorded water levels. “[T]he oldest 
inhabitant, who claimed that he had seen the river go clear out of its banks and 
flood the entire valley prior to 1850, was deemed to be in his dotage and un-
trustworthy,” recounted civil engineer H. V. Hinckley (Hinckley 1914, 622). A 
mere six years later, however, a large flood caused the city engineer’s records 
to be amended to reflect a 28-foot range, and the bridge sat under six feet of 
water. “The oldest inhabitant was vindicated, and the river proved what every-
one should have known,” Hinckley wrote – that 25 years was hardly a suffi-
cient sample of time to expect to see a river’s greatest flood (Hinckley 1914, 
622). The waters of 1903 merely put the bridge out of commission temporarily, 
but after enduring several other floods higher than those its builders designed for, 
the Melan Arch Bridge collapsed during a flooding event in July of 1965, costing 
the life of a commuter who became trapped in his vehicle (Hooper 2007). 
                                                             
∗  Brian Rumsey, Department of History, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, USA;  
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If the bridge was being built today, critics might ask whether its planners 
were taking into account the hundred-year floodplain. At the dawn of the twen-
tieth century, however, such terminology was not yet in use. There existed no 
accepted method to estimate the frequency and probability of floods of particu-
lar magnitudes. In a few cases, engineers had offered formulas that could apply 
to individual streams, but more commonly, people simply had to rely on rec-
orded flood levels, or even the memory of local residents. In order to more 
accurately understand the levels of flooding that they needed to plan for, the 
designers of the Melan Arch Bridge would have needed a much more lengthy 
chronological record – or another method of understanding flood levels. Such a 
method would develop over the course of the twentieth century, elucidating 
assumptions about the functioning of the natural world, specific socio-political 
imperatives, and an increased awareness of probability within the public con-
sciousness of the United States. 
The growth of the idea that river floods are a quantifiable risk is a process to 
which few historians have devoted much attention, yet it yields insights into the 
ways that people have known their natural surroundings numerically, and into 
the social and political as well as the mathematical and statistical elements of 
how and when this knowledge has been produced (Reuss 2002; Kirby and 
Moss 1987).1 Today, the methods and language of probability are crucial to the 
operation of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), an institution creat-
ed by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, and largely because of the 
NFIP’s needs, detailed surveys of flood risk in many parts of the United States 
exist. This may be seen as an attempt to account for nature not so much to 
enable sustainable use of natural resources, but to enable a sustainable method 
of coping with environmental risk.2 Due to various factors, the NFIP has not 
been an especially successful example of taking nature into account, but its 
creators certainly had that intention.3 
Civil engineers in private practice made important early contributions to 
humanity’s ability to view this specific part of the natural world through the 
lens of probability. Their work was originally most important in creating cost-
benefit analyses of proposed flood control structures like levees and reservoirs, 
analyses that saw an increase in demand as the federal government took an 
                                                             
1  Martin Reuss has provided an insightful look at some of the earlier developments in flood 
probability studies, and the author wishes to acknowledge his debt to Reuss’s work in build-
ing an understanding of the early developments in flood probability analysis. 
2  In contrast to the emphasis of Höhler and Ziegler (2010) on taking nature into account “for 
the sake of maximizing sustained yield and producing sustainable quality” (417). 
3  Despite repeated legislative modifications, the NFIP has struggled with financial losses 
throughout its existence, and remains troubled as of 2014. Theodore Steinberg (2000) high-
lights the ways certain industries have used their lobbying power to push for weaker flood in-
surance regulations. He also acknowledges the problem of repetitive losses, as does Lübken 
(2010). 
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increased role in flood prevention efforts starting in the 1930s. A generation 
later, as flood insurance inched closer to reality in the United States, new em-
phasis was placed not just on predicting flood magnitudes, but on understand-
ing the areas they would affect and on acceptable levels of risk. Since its early 
years, the NFIP has placed tremendous importance on the 100-year flood, a 
term that demonstrates the extent to which humans now endeavor to know 
nature through numbers. The idea of the 100-year floodplain not only suggests 
an ability to predict the vagaries of the natural world, but also implies an un-
derstanding of just how far people can safely push nature’s limits.  
Flooding is not an entirely unknown risk, in that people generally tend to 
have some idea that streams and rivers may swell from time to time. What is 
not always understood is just how likely those streams and rivers are to surge. 
Of course, even today, nobody can predict flood magnitudes or frequencies 
with complete accuracy. Over the past century, though, the study of flood fre-
quencies has been transformed from an obscure pursuit into a well-established 
discipline. Today, people speak of the hundred-year flood, and the hundred-
year floodplain – but where did these terms come from? How is it that one can 
make sense of broad portions of the United States in these terms? This is not 
simply a story of the upward trajectory of hydrological knowledge. Certainly, 
advances in hydrological understanding are crucial to our numerical under-
standing of the natural world in the context of floods, but this knowledge is 
also borne of specific social and political imperatives. 
Studies undertaken upon Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and the Dayton, Ohio ar-
ea in the 1910s were much more thorough than the consideration that had been 
given to the construction of Topeka’s Melan Bridge, and serve as representa-
tive samples of the state of the art in flood studies at that time (Flood Commis-
sion of Pittsburgh 1912). The Flood Commission of Pittsburgh was composed 
of civil engineers, city officials, and business leaders, and completed a study of 
the city’s vulnerability to flooding in 1912. In the commission’s report, a sec-
tion analyzing future possible floods went well beyond assuming that the great-
est flood of record is the maximum flood that must be planned for. Nonethe-
less, the commission made no attempt to mathematically determine the 
likelihood of such a greater flood. Rather, it justified the claim that higher 
floods were likely by reviewing what could have happened if recent scenarios 
had unfolded differently. In the winter of 1909-1910, for instance, the city had 
received unprecedented snowfall. “If a rain similar to any one of the frequent 
heavy, warm spring rains had occurred” when the winter’s snows were melting, 
the report suggested that “the snow on the ground at the end of February, 1910, 
would have melted and run off with this rain,” leading to a flood greater than 
that of 1907 (Flood Commission of Pittsburgh 1912, 48). The Miami Conserv-
ancy District (MCD), organized in response to the heavy flooding that had hit 
Dayton and surrounding areas in 1913, produced a several volumes of studies 
on the Miami River in connection with its project to build five flood control 
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dams in the area. The engineers of the MCD stopped short of probabilistic 
modeling, but used several centuries of data on European river flows to observe 
that “floods which occur on an average of once in a century or two,” which 
seemed an accurate appraisal of the 1913 Dayton flood’s magnitude, “have 
been exceeded in the course of many centuries,” but rarely by much. In project-
ing the maximum possible flood in the Miami Valley, the MCD, headed by 
civil engineer Arthur Morgan, theorized that by designing for a flood 40 per-
cent greater than that of 1913, they would achieve complete safety with room 
to spare, assuming climatic stability (Woodward 1920, 44-5). 
Neither the Topekans, nor the Pittsburghers, nor the Miami Conservancy 
District had the toolbox of probability at their disposal, but this situation would 
soon change. Weston Fuller, a civil engineer and a partner in the New York 
engineering firm Hazen & Whipple, published the first comprehensive statisti-
cal approach to estimating river flood frequencies and magnitudes (Fuller 
1914a). Fuller himself remains a rather obscure character – he had few other 
publications to his credit, and his available biographical information is decided-
ly sparse – but his work on flood probabilities endows him with a definite 
historical significance. Fuller’s work did have some precedents (Rafter 1903; 
Horton 1913), but the critical distinction between his work and that which had 
come before was that earlier efforts tended to focus on individual bodies of 
water, whereas the Fuller article proposed a method that would be applicable 
for rivers and streams throughout the country. 
Fuller’s firm, which produced much of the most important flood frequency 
research of the early twentieth century, was founded in 1904 by George Whip-
ple and Allen Hazen – the latter of whom also figures prominently in this essay 
– and focused especially on city sanitation and water supply systems in the 
early twentieth century (Kennelly 1925; Hendricks 2011). It comes as little 
surprise that those with an interest in sanitary engineering produced much of 
the early American work on flood probabilities. In a contemporary debate over 
whether it was better for cities to build individual sewer systems for wastes and 
for storm runoff, or whether combined systems that would handle both types of 
outflow were the better choice, many sanitary engineers – including George 
Whipple and Allen Hazen – favored the latter solution. Thus, the potential for 
downpours and floods was naturally an important component of their analysis 
(Tarr 2002). 
Fuller’s paper “Flood Flows” was presented to the American Society of Civ-
il Engineers in October 1913, and was published the following year (Fuller 
1914a). Within the article, Fuller laid out the practices employed by Hazen and 
Whipple at the time, methods that were advanced beyond what had been de-
scribed in any contemporary source (Hazen 1930). Nearly a century after its 
publication, Fuller’s paper remains a landmark in the study of flood frequen-
cies, and it is likewise a sign of a significant shift in the way that people, or at 
least experts, understood the natural world in which they lived. Though humans 
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had been practically aware of the concept of probability for millennia – gam-
bling and casting lots are ancient manifestations of this awareness – it had only 
relatively recently emerged as a field of scientific inquiry (Porter 1986; Daston 
1988). To understand the behavior of the natural world through the principle of 
probability is an extremely different approach than believing that it adheres to 
simple mechanistic rules, or that it is under the control of supernatural powers.4 
As the Topeka incident reveals, in the early years of the twentieth century, 
one of the greatest challenges facing anyone who wished to understand the 
frequency of floods in the United States was the absence of long-term records, 
a challenge Fuller readily acknowledged. “If the data for all the floods that 
have occurred in a single river for several hundred years were available, a 
relation could be established showing the average frequency with which floods 
of any size occur,” the engineer wrote (Fuller 1914a, 573). Lacking the luxury 
of such data, however, Fuller and his colleagues were forced to devise a differ-
ent approach. With the equations proposed in Fuller’s article, not only could 
one predict the probabilities for different levels of floods on a single stream, 
one could do so for almost any stream that had at least a relatively brief flow 
record available. Rather than simply tabulating flood records to highlight large 
floods, however, these engineers offered mathematical formulae that would 
enable one to calculate predicted frequencies and magnitudes, even in the ab-
sence of long-term written flood records. Fifteen years was suddenly enough of 
a record to produce a detailed set of predictions. Hazen, though perhaps biased 
due to his close professional relationship with Fuller, lavished praise on the 
latter’s publication. His hailing of the article as “the first attempt to apply the 
principles of probabilities to the flood problem,” despite receiving a bit of 
pushback from contemporaries who felt that they had prior claims to this title, 
generally withstands scrutiny, particularly when speaking of a generalizable 
model rather than one created for a specific stream (Hazen 1914, 626). 
Fuller’s chosen method to create his formula was to utilize data from many 
rivers, but over a shorter period of time. “As rivers follow the same general 
law, it is allowable to use the data on all the rivers in the same way as those on 
a single river, provided such data can be put on a common basis,” he argued, in 
defense of this method (Fuller 1914a, 574). In other words, he worked on the 
assumption that all streams will demonstrate a consistent relationship between 
average yearly floods and infrequent, high-volume events, and because of this, 
ten years of data from ten rivers would be nearly as good as one hundred years 
from one river, and fifteen years or more of data from hundreds of rivers would 
be far better yet. He planned to create such a common basis through the use of 
the yearly average flood, which is the average of the highest level of flow 
                                                             
4  For a detailed discussion of the transition in understandings of natural disasters, specifically 
hail, from divine retribution to nature theology to experimental science, see Oberholzner 
(2011). 
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reached each year for any particular channel. “[T]he ratio of the larger floods to 
the yearly average floods should be the same for all rivers for the same period 
of time,” Fuller justified (Fuller 1914a, 574). Though the assumption that short 
chronological records from numerous streams can stand in for longer chrono-
logical records makes a certain sense, it nonetheless suggests a certain naiveté 
in regard to the natural world. Since weather patterns tend to affect large areas, 
neighboring streams will likely share common trends. If one region had experi-
enced an especially wet fifteen years, chances are that nearby regions might 
have also experienced elevated moisture during those years. By way of exam-
ple, using data from the Kansas River and ten nearby streams for 1900-1910, 
the sample size would have been one hundred years of river data (ten years 
each from ten rivers), but would have shown the 1903 flood to be a one-in-ten 
event if it had occurred on all ten bodies of water. 
Fuller offered a pair of formulas to be used in determining probable flood 
magnitudes. One formula produced determinations of the predicted greatest 
average flow over a 24-hour period to be expected during a given time period, 
based on the river’s catchment area and a coefficient specific to an individual 
stream. The other formula built on the first, allowing one to use the number 
derived from the first formula to calculate the maximum probable flood over 
the same period of time. In these formulas, the coefficient played an important 
role. It was the component of the equation that allowed it to be applied to a 
wide range of streams, rather than tying it to a particular river or creek. The 
coefficient needed be calculated for any specific riparian location for which one 
wished to compute flood probabilities. The practicality of Fuller’s formula was 
that the coefficient could be calculated based on the average yearly flood. 
Though this number would be more accurate the more time is taken into con-
sideration, relatively short periods of time nonetheless provided reasonably 
useful data. The 25-year records used in Topeka in 1897, while they were badly 
insufficient as a window of time in which to look for the upper limits of flood-
ing potential, would have been more than enough to calculate a serviceable 
coefficient based on average yearly floods. In his study, Fuller set a standard of 
15 years as a minimum level of information for calculating a sound coefficient 
(Fuller 1914b, 684). 
Topeka was not the site of early flood probability work, but by considering 
it, one can gain a two-fold insight into how the engineers working on flood 
probabilities needed a specific kind of data, and how their methods had diffi-
culties incorporating other forms of flood knowledge. Without exact measure-
ments and records from the intervening years, it would have been difficult for 
an engineer using Fuller’s probabilistic model to incorporate vernacular 
knowledge of historical events such as the pre-1850 Topeka flood into a useful 
data set. Further, the United States was not uninhabited prior to the arrival of 
Europeans, and its American Indian inhabitants might have been able to cor-
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roborate the senior citizen’s memory – though their knowledge would have 
been equally difficult for probabilistic modelers to engage with. 
The products of Fuller’s equations came in the form of flood flows, a meas-
urement of volume over time. Although the determination of probable flood 
flows was a notable achievement, simply understanding how much water will 
pass through a given waterway is not the same as understanding the extent of 
the area that will be affected. The two types of knowledge are indeed closely 
related, yet far from identical. Hazen alluded to this difference in his 1930 book 
Flood Flows: “It would be theoretically possible to draw a line down the bank 
of a stream above which there would be only one chance in ten that water 
would rise in any one year,” the engineer wrote, “and to draw another and 
higher line above which there would be only one chance in a hundred, and so 
on for higher and less frequent floods” (Hazen 1930, 2). In 1930, this was a 
great challenge, one that was only “theoretically possible.” Such knowledge 
would be essential, however, to endeavors such as the successful implementa-
tion of flood insurance. 
The historical developments out of which Fuller’s report emerged cannot be 
neglected. While the Fuller equations were broadly useful in part because they 
did not require extensive flood records, they did nonetheless require some 
records. Fifteen years was Fuller’s stated minimum record to create a reliable 
coefficient, and by the early twentieth century, the United States Geological 
Survey had collected stream flow data over at least fifteen years for numerous 
waterways. Additionally, interest in floods was increasing in the United States. 
While the federal government had not yet become involved in flood control and 
floodplain management nearly to the extent that it would in future decades, it 
was funding extensive flood control infrastructure – albeit under the guise of 
navigational improvement – along the Mississippi River, through the Missis-
sippi River Commission (Camillo and Pearcy 2004). Further, regional govern-
mental entities were taking a greater interest in flood control, as evidenced by 
the major studies commissioned in Pittsburgh and Dayton and discussed previ-
ously in this essay. 
Though flood probabilities could have many uses, Fuller clearly saw them 
as a tool to determine the prudent magnitude of physical flood protection struc-
tures. His contemporaries, however, recognized that his equations could be 
useful in other arenas as well. Although Fuller’s equation had not been explicit-
ly developed with insurance in mind, his professional colleagues quickly ob-
served its potential importance for that purpose. “Perhaps the best practical idea 
of the significance of these figures may be obtained by considering them from 
the standpoint of insurance,” Hazen wrote in response to Fuller’s presentation. 
“There is one chance in ten that the 10-year flood will occur in any one year; 
one chance in one hundred that the 100-year flood will occur; and one chance 
in 1000 that the 1000-year flood will occur” (Hazen 1914, 630). 
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Hazen’s 1930 book “Flood Flows” did not overturn Fuller’s earlier work, 
but rather refined it. “The methods set forth in Mr. Fuller’s paper have been 
added to and perfected with the lapse of time, but the basic method is still used 
as the most satisfactory available procedure,” Hazen wrote in the introduction 
to his own volume (Hazen 1930, v). Though Hazen’s work included technical 
refinements to Fuller’s methods, perhaps its more interesting contribution is its 
discussion of the applicability of flood-probability analysis to situations in the 
real world. This is not to say that Fuller’s earlier analysis had been a mere 
intellectual or academic exercise, but Hazen’s book provides insight into the 
ways that Fuller’s work had been utilized in the years since its publication. One 
important contribution that probability studies added to the body of knowledge 
concerning floods related to the dominant form of protection employed during 
the early twentieth century, levees. “Flood prevention work must be wisely 
directed as otherwise it may prove to be worse than useless,” Hazen wrote.  
A levee that holds small floods, but is not high and strong enough to hold a 
large one, may inspire confidence in the minds of the people through a term of 
years when the levee functions, and so lead more people to live behind it, and 
ultimately bring greater disaster (Hazen 1930, 178). 
No doubt, this was a statement that could have been made decades or even 
centuries earlier. The difference, however, was that as probability grew in 
acceptance as a method to understand flood levels, people could more accurate-
ly understand whether the levees they built would be likely to stand up to the 
larger floods that were possible in their area, because they could gain a better 
idea of just how great those floods might be. 
Through the time of Hazen’s 1930 publication of “Flood Flows,” work on 
flood probability had generally been the purview of private enterprise. Though 
the work of these engineers had sometimes been at the request of municipalities 
or other governmental entities, government itself had largely been uninvolved 
in the science of understanding flood frequencies. This would soon change, 
though. Over the coming years, the federal government would play a growing 
role in the work on flood probability. Universities also became centers of in-
quiry into the topic, where before they had not been leading players. The feder-
al government’s increased interest in flood probability studies was no doubt 
related to its increased role in flood protection and floodplain management, a 
change brought about in large part by the Flood Control Act of 1936. More 
generally, the policies of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal had also meant that 
the federal government was playing an increased role in the creation and dis-
semination of scientific expertise of various sorts. The growing governmental 
interest in flood probability was clearly visible in the 1936 publication of 
Floods in the United States: Magnitude and Frequency by the United States 
Geological Survey (Jarvis 1936). 
Though published by the Geological Survey, this massive work was com-
piled in conjunction with the Mississippi Valley Committee and its successor 
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organization, the Water Planning Committee of the National Resources Board. 
Its lead author, Clarence Jarvis, was a respected hydrologist in the employ of 
the USGS. “The need for a more complete and systematic knowledge of floods 
was impressed upon the Mississippi Valley Committee early in its considera-
tion of public works projects involving river utilization and control,” the au-
thors stated in the report’s introduction (Jarvis 1936, 10). To address this per-
ception, the report offered an overview of the most important work that had 
been done on flood frequencies and magnitudes over the past half-century, and 
also provided flood data for over 200 flood-prone United States rivers, general-
ly at least 20 years’ worth of information. The objective of the Jarvis report 
was not to break new theoretical ground, but to compile the state of the art, 
both in theory and data, and to make that information broadly available for 
general reference. 
In addition to the release of the Jarvis report, the year 1936 also marked the 
climax of a dramatic shift in federal flood control policy that would lead the 
government to take a more active interest in the prediction and understanding 
of flood magnitudes. Earlier federal flood policy had generally held that bene-
fitting localities must provide a majority of the financial support for flood con-
trol projects that received federal dollars. That requirement was lifted for flood 
control efforts along the Mississippi River in 1928, in recognition of the money 
already spent by states and localities along that river, and likely also in re-
sponse to the devastating Mississippi River floods of 1927. As a result of the 
Flood Control Act of 1936, the rest of the nation was placed on the same stand-
ing as the Mississippi River, a piece of legislation that declared flooding to be a 
threat to the national well-being (Arnold 1988). Because of this assessment of 
the dangers of floods, the act declared that  
the Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of 
navigable waters or their tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-
control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess 
of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are other-
wise adversely affected (United States 1936).  
This legislation clearly suggested the idea of cost-benefit analysis. In terms of 
flood protection, effective cost-benefit analyses are obviously dependent upon 
a strong understanding of flood probability. The potential damages caused by a 
flood of a certain magnitude may be balanced against the likelihood of that 
flood’s occurrence to help determine whether the costs of a given effort at 
flood control are justified by the benefits they provide (Porter 1995). 
The 1930s also marked the beginning of the career of a geographer who 
would come to play an outsized role in the development of flood plain policy in 
the United States. Gilbert White began his career working for several New 
Deal-era federal agencies, including the Mississippi Valley Committee, the 
Water Resources Committee, and the Bureau of the Budget. White received his 
education at the University of Chicago, where he studied under the prominent 
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geographer Harlan Barrows (Hinshaw 2006). His reputation would ultimately 
grow upon the foundation he laid with his 1945 dissertation Human Adjustment 
to Floods, in which he laid out his perspectives on the ways people should use 
floodplains and adjust to the danger of flooding (White 1945). White had start-
ed graduate school in the early 1930s, but his advisor Barrows left his universi-
ty post to work for the federal government in 1933, and brought his promising 
student along. White spent most of the 1930s working on flood control projects 
for the federal government, an experience that helped inform him as he com-
pleted his dissertation. 
White’s dissertation and subsequent work were significant for the emphasis 
they placed on accommodating floods, in an era when ever-greater flood con-
trol and protection structures such as levees and reservoirs had long been the 
norm. “[F]loods are ‘acts of God,’ but flood losses are largely acts of man,” the 
young geographer wrote in his dissertation. “Human encroachment upon the 
flood plains of rivers accounts for the high annual toll of flood losses” (White 
1945, 2). On a similar note to the Flood Control Act of 1936, White stressed 
the importance of flood magnitude and frequency predictions for effective cost-
benefit analyses. He was also one of the early proponents of adjustments in-
cluding flood plain zoning and flood insurance, both of which rely centrally 
upon strong understandings of flood frequencies and magnitudes. 
White’s advocacy for flood insurance in the 1940s was not entirely unprece-
dented, yet neither was he the champion of a product that was already widely 
available. Private companies had sporadically offered flood insurance to Amer-
ican customers from the late 1890s onward, but none had managed to do so in a 
financially sustainable manner. Although the federally-backed National Flood 
Insurance Program was not created until 1968, an earlier effort to institute a 
federal flood insurance program that took place during the Truman administra-
tion is illustrative of the changes occurring in the American political climate by 
the 1950s, as well as the challenges that remained before a national flood insur-
ance program could be created (Rumsey 2010). Federal involvement in war 
risk insurance during World War II had provided a model that proponents of 
flood insurance saw as a valid precedent for their idea, with the federal gov-
ernment underwriting policies offered by private companies. The federal gov-
ernment underwrote these policies because of the broader benefits they offered 
to society in the form of business confidence – private insurers were unwilling 
to take the risk themselves – yet these policies also netted the government a 
tidy profit. Flood insurance proponents hoped for a repeat performance. The 
United States’ self-perceived status as the guardian of the free world and the 
strongest bulwark against communism also led Truman to couch his support for 
flood insurance in national security terms that would not have carried the same 
significance in earlier years. 
Ultimately, however, the challenges that Truman’s proposal faced, both po-
litical and technical, proved to be too formidable. Truman himself hailed from 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  144 
the Kansas City metropolitan area, which was the same region whose floods 
had inspired the push for a flood insurance program. This surely increased his 
interest in the rehabilitation of that region, but was likely also on the minds of 
lawmakers who suspected that the proposal was too regionally driven. Some 
congressmen feared that a federal system of flood insurance would set a dan-
gerous precedent of government encroachment into the domain of private en-
terprise, while others saw the proposal as a potential money pit that would do 
little more than subsidize unwise development in flood-prone regions. 
Even if the political will had existed, technical hurdles also presented them-
selves. The intimate geographical knowledge required to produce insurance 
ratings was simply not available for many parts of the country in the early 
1950s. The difficulties inherent in insuring flood losses demonstrate the unique 
challenges that high waters posed to those involved in understanding risk, 
particularly environmental risk. Few other commonly encountered hazards 
involve such specific geographic variability. One property owner who owns 
land along a river may be at high risk for suffering flood damages, while a 
neighbor, 100 feet away but 10 feet higher, may confront very little risk of 
flood damage. It is hard to imagine 100 feet making nearly as much difference 
in the level of risk for most other hazards, such as tornadoes, hail, lightning, 
hurricanes, or fires. Floods present an additional challenge because their risk is 
not easily quantified. Measures such as elevation or distance from a body of 
water do not tell the entire story by themselves, but must be combined with 
flood probability projections, a painstaking process. This theme is clearly evi-
dent in the Truman-era discussion of flood insurance. A report issued by the 
Insurance Executives Association drove the point home especially effectively.  
If flood insurance were to be undertaken without unfair discrimination, it 
would be necessary to have not only a complete hydrological survey of each 
river basin and flood area in the country but also a detailed hydrological sur-
vey of each ‘reach’ of each river and, in addition, a detailed survey and ap-
praisal of each property to be insured” (Insurance Executives Association 
1952, 9). 
The cost of developing such ratings, the report argued, would be “considerable 
and perhaps in many cases […] disproportionately prohibitive.” (Insurance 
Executives Association 1952, 9-10) 
Along with the hurdles it faced, the Truman-led effort also lacked the con-
text of a broader political agenda. While Truman and his administration were 
not entirely uninterested in environmental issues, the aftermath of World War 
II occupied the nation’s attention over much of his presidency. Little more than 
a decade later, the scene started to change. Just as Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society of the mid-1960s followed the New Deal to form two of the most sig-
nificant domestic initiatives of the twentieth century, it also produced another 
wave of important developments in the rationalization of flood risk. The 1960s 
were a decade of dramatic changes in the emphasis placed on flood probability 
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by the federal government, which went along with a broader slate of environ-
mental initiatives, including the Wilderness Act of 1964 and several pieces of 
legislation geared toward improving environmental quality. In the introduction 
to a major 1966 federal report on managing and reducing flood losses, Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson couched the need for action in the terms of his admin-
istration’s signature initiative. “[A] Great Society cannot rest on the achieve-
ments of the past. It must constantly strive to develop new means to meet the 
needs of the people,” Johnson wrote. “To hold the Nation’s toll of flood losses 
in check and to promote wise use of its valley lands requires new and imagina-
tive action” (United States 1966, iii). The report outlined five basic goals for 
recommended attention: improvement of basic knowledge on flood hazards, 
coordination and planning of new developments on flood plains, enhanced 
technical support for people owning or managing flood plain property, the 
creation of a national program for flood insurance, and to reexamine federal 
flood control policy (United States 1966, 1-2). In particular, one objective was 
that “[a] uniform technique of determining flood frequency should be devel-
oped by a panel of the Water Resources Council” (United States 1966, 1). 
The Water Resources Council, an eleven-member body that counted several 
Johnson-administration cabinet members in its number, moved quickly to ad-
dress this objective, utilizing expertise from governmental arms including the 
Army Corps of Engineers, the United States Geological Survey, the Soil Con-
servation Service, the Forest Service, the Weather Bureau, the Bureau of Rec-
lamation, the Bureau of Public Roads, the Federal Power Commission, and the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (United States 1967, 15). Though the equations for 
predicting flood magnitude probabilities had been much refined since the days 
of Fuller, the basic approach endorsed by the Water Resources Council re-
mained the same. 
Methodology for flood probability analysis was one question that faced the 
experts and bureaucrats of the mid-twentieth century. Another issue they had to 
deal with was making their numbers useful. Would people be most interested in 
the mean annual flood, which is the highest level of flooding to be expected in 
the average year? Or, perhaps, the level of flood that could be expected a cer-
tain percent of the time? As a result of decisions made around the implementa-
tion of the National Flood Insurance Program, the most commonly used stand-
ard in the United States, and indeed in many parts of the world, has been the 
one-percent flood, more commonly referred to as the hundred-year flood. This 
is the magnitude of flood that is judged to have a one-percent chance of occur-
ring in any one year, and is statistically the average greatest flood to be ex-
pected over a 100-year period. 
This standard was certainly not a new innovation in the 1960s. As far back 
as 1934, an Army engineer had published a paper specifically addressing meth-
ods of determining the hundred-year flood at any given observation station, and 
his commentary suggested that he was not the first to make use of this standard 
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(Pettis 1934). As enacted, the National Flood Insurance Program did not in-
clude a specific standard for flood risk guidelines. Rather, the legislation called 
upon the Department of Housing and Urban Development to come up with a 
suitable standard, and to achieve this goal, HUD enlisted the aid of the Center 
for Urban Studies at the University of Chicago. The Center for Urban Studies 
held a seminar to address the question, and the consensus of the experts present 
at the seminar was that the hundred-year standard marked a reasonable com-
promise between prudence and development interests (White et al. 1969). 
The institution of the hundred-year floodplain as a legal guideline proved con-
tentious at times. Much of this concern stemmed from two related complaints. 
One was that the bounds of the floodplain could be inaccurate. The other was that 
they did not represent reality. John Rousakis, the mayor of Savannah, Georgia, 
alluded to the first concern in testimony provided to Congress in 1973. Noting 
that the National Flood Insurance Program was to determine the flood-risk status 
of communities based upon the 100-year floodplain, the mayor challenged this 
statistical approach. “This poses no problem if the Secretary approves a contour 
established on the basis of accurate historical data,” the mayor testified. “How-
ever, if the contour is established on the basis of unsupported theoretical data, the 
results can be disastrous” (United States 1973, 50). Rousakis had been notified 
that the 100-year floodplain in Savannah would be established at somewhere 
between 14 and 16 feet above sea level, which was several feet higher than any 
flooding the city had experienced over the past 100 years. 
Though formulas to determine the probability of flood magnitudes had been 
developed over the 50 years prior to the congressional hearing, those on the 
front lines held strong concerns about how probable flood levels were deter-
mined. “I do not know how to identify it – how they arrive at a 100-year flood 
level,” Rousakis stated (United States 1973, 53). His associate, Savannah city 
manager Arthur Mendonsa, was just as uncertain: “We are told it is a subjective 
matter, like Alice in Wonderland, it is what someone says it is” (United States 
1973, 53). These complaints are demonstrative of the challenges involved in 
determining the physical area with potential for inundation. Though they may 
not match up perfectly with predictions derived from formulas or curves, flood 
flow volumes are nice, cold sets of numbers, easy to manipulate and work with. 
The greater the flood, the greater the flow volume. Floodplains, however, are 
much messier. Although the delineation of the 100-year floodplain is ap-
proached through a standardized method, Mendonsa had a point when he called 
it subjective, in that it must depend to some extent on human discernment. 
Floodplains have varied contours, requiring detailed study. Studies of flood 
flow magnitudes had given the world the concept of flood recurrences such as 
the 100-year flood, but truly knowing nature through numbers would be a 
much taller task. 
Some understanding of the challenges involved in translating the 100-year 
flood into the real world can be gained through an examination of the flood 
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insurance studies produced by the Federal Insurance Administration of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. Over the mid-to-late 1970s, 
thousands of these studies were produced, each examining a particular flood-
prone city or region in the United States. These studies fulfilled a requirement 
of the National Flood Insurance Act that communities must undergo flood risk 
assessments before becoming eligible for participation in the National Flood 
Insurance Program. Though the studies were produced in the same format 
(United States, Federal Insurance Administration 1977), they were not pro-
duced by a single group or agency. Rather, they were contracted out to federal 
agencies including the United States Geological Survey, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, as well 
as private firms. Whereas engineers such as Fuller and Hazen had devised and 
refined methods of calculating flood flow magnitudes and probabilities that 
were designed to be applied to any stream, each flood insurance study com-
bined methods of probability with painstaking on-the-ground analysis to pro-
duce an assessment of flood risk that was deemed sufficient for the purposes of 
the National Flood Insurance Program. 
It would not be accurate to portray the National Flood Insurance Program 
solely as an agent of improved understanding of flood probabilities. Declara-
tions of flood risk have the potential to be contentions for their effects on prop-
erty values, and once initial declarations have been made, it is inevitable that 
strong interests will sometimes oppose newer evaluations that upend estab-
lished expectations – badly weakening the financial sustainability of the NFIP.5 
However, there can be little doubt that the National Flood Insurance Program’s 
existence has been an important contributing factor in the development of the 
vast body of knowledge of flood risks in the United States, and by extension, 
has helped bolster the public awareness of probability and environmental risk. 
Rather than a simple, unalloyed march of scientific progress, this understanding 
of floods is the result of specific evolutions in the American sociopolitical 
climate. 
In the early years of the twenty-first century, however, this understanding 
has been thrown into doubt. Changes in land use have long confounded proba-
bilistic understandings of flood recurrence, and while flood risk assessments 
are updated from time to time, they often fail to keep pace with the ways peo-
ple inhabit the land. More recently, and more profoundly, anthropogenic cli-
mate change has forced scientists and engineers to examine their assumptions 
about how the past informs us of the future. Stationarity may now be dead to 
hydrologists, but the simplicity of the hundred-year floodplain remains seduc-
                                                             
5  Steinberg (2000) offers a pointed critique of the National Flood Insurance Program in this 
vein. 
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tive.6 As an idea, it need not disappear, and indeed it remains a powerful way to 
communicate risk and take the natural world into account – but without meth-
ods of understanding flood probability that can take a changing climate into 
consideration, it will communicate risk inaccurately. As global and regional 
climates continue to shift, the ‘hundred-year’ terminology will continue to lose 
applicability. Flood risks in 2050 may look very different than they did in 
1950, or than they will in 2150. A one-percent floodplain is meaningful even in 
the face of ongoing change. Fuller may have displayed a certain environmental 
naiveté by assuming that a few years’ worth of data from many rivers could 
substitute for a century’s worth from a single stream, but this method did and 
would have the advantage of capturing a better representation of the present 
climatic conditions, rather than a long-running average that could include cli-
matically confusing data. At present, it is clear that entrenched financial inter-
ests have impeded the success of the National Flood Insurance Program, but 
even they may be of secondary concern when compared to the challenges of 
understanding ever-evolving flood risks. 
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